Two members of Myanmar’s ruling junta and two military units join the list of those placed under US sanctions following the deadly response in the Southeast Asian country against anti-coup demonstrators that have resulted in over 250 deaths so far.
“Today’s actions send a strong signal that we will follow through on our pledges to continue to take action against coup leaders and those who perpetrate violence,” said US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a statement on Monday (22 March).
Before this, President Joe Biden’s administration had already blacklisted top junta members and several military-owned companies. However, the sanctions do not appear to have had a positive effect in getting the military, known as the Tatmadaw, to change course.
The European Union has also imposed sanctions on Monday on 11 people linked to the coup in Myanmar which happened on 1 Feb, deposing the democratically election administration led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the National Leave for Democracy (NLD).
Canada and the United Kingdom have also imposed sanctions on the Tatmadaw over the coup and subsequent violent response to protestors, including imposing travel bans on individuals members of the military and freezing their assets in each respective countries.
The recent sanction by the US targets a military officer who was tapped to lead the police force following the coup, Than Hlaing, and a special operations commander Lieutenant General Aung Soe who is overseeing the current crackdown.
With the sanctions, any assets of those blacklisted will be frozen and Americans are barred from dealing with these individuals.
The two military units sanctioned are the army’s 77th Light Infantry Division and 33rd Light Infantry Division which were deployed to suppress anti-coup demonstrations in the cities of Yangon and Mandalay. The 33rd unit are already under sanctions by the US for its involvement in the military’s 2017 assault on Rohingya Muslims.
The US, and other nations, are attempting to force the Myanmar military to end the coup via these sanctions, but is it actually working?
Singapore holds significant investment in Myanmar and monies from Myanmar military leaders in city state
Would sanctions from Singapore perhaps be more effective, especially given Singapore’s ties to Myanmar and, particularly, their assets held in Singapore.
Selth noted, “Since the 1988 uprising, Singapore’s approach to Burma has been, above all, a highly pragmatic and self-interested one”, with Singapore being the third largest supplier to Myanmar behind Japan and Germany at the time the book was written 20 years ago.
Since then, Singapore has become the country’s largest foreign investor in Myanmar, according to the World Bank, accounting for 34 percent of overall approved investment. The Global New Light of Myanmar reported last October that about 20 Singapore-listed enterprises brought in US$1.85 billion into Myanmar in the past financial year 2019-2020.
According to Dr Oh Su-Ann’s report in 2019 – a visiting fellow with ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute – Singapore’s investment in Myanmar involved 305 firms in total, consisting of Singaporean and Singapore-based enterprises.
Selth notes in his book that the business relationship has only grown between Myanmar and Singapore over the decades. In 1973, a ministerial-level committee was establised by both countries to ‘forge mutual benefits in investment, trade and economic sectors’, and a high priority was given to technology transfers.
Since then, these bilateral economic ties have continued to expand. Selth wrote, “Singaporean companies are also heavily involved in a number of major Burmese government infrastructure projects, such as a US$166 million project to construct the new Thanlyin-Kyauktan industrial zone near Rangoon, and a US$50 million container port at Thilawa, 10 kilometres south of Rangoon.”
The author also asserts that ministers in Myanmar were urged by senior military figures to give preference to projects supported by the Singapore government.
“There have been several other reports of Burmese money being laundered through Singapore, not only by Golden Triangle drug lords but also by individual members of the Burmese military leadership,” the book notes.
The relationship goes beyond just economics, with Singapore being a country that has “significant military partnerships” with Myanmar, according to Selth.
“When the SLORC suffered the withdrawal of external aid in September [1988], and the imposition of an arms embargo by the Western democracies, Singapore was the first country to come to the regime’s rescue,” the book notes. This includes shipping ordinances—such as mortar, ammunition, and raw materials—to arms factories in Myanmar in violation of agreements with Swedish government.
“In August 1989 Singapore was again accused of providing arms to the SLORC when weapons and ammunition originating in Belgium and Israel were trans-shipped to Burma, apparently with the assistance of SKS Marketing, a newly formed Singapore-based joint venture with the Burmese military regime,” the book goes on to explain.
The relationship continued to blossom with Singapore as the main trans-shipment point for arms deliveries to Myanmar from various countries, and went beyond just sales and shipment of arms into cybersecurity, vehicles and even training.
“A number of Burma Army officers have attended SAF staff colleges, at least seven Burma Air Force officers have been trained in Singapore, and the SAF has provided training (in Singapore) to specialist units like the Burma Army parachute team,” Selth noted in the book.
We also note that so far, there does not seem to be any clarification from government linked companies in Singapore that they are not supporting the Myanmar military with technical advise and armaments.
Clearly, if there was any country that would be able to apply pressure on the Tatmadaw to cease the coup, it is Singapore given both the strong economic and military ties as well as flow of monies from Myanmar military leadership into Singapore.
Even so, Minister of Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan has urged against widespread sanctions on Myanmar, stressing that ordinary people would suffer most as a result.
In Parliament in February, Dr Balakrishnan cited the World Bank’s estimate that about 25 percent of the Myanmar population lives below the poverty line, a reality that has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
“And so in all my discussions, my phone calls, I have said that we should not embark on widespread, generalised indiscriminate sanctions, because the people who will suffer most would be the ordinary people in Myanmar,” he said.
Instead, Dr Balakrishnan called on stakeholders in Myanmar to find a “long term, peaceful political solution including a return to its path of democratic transition.”
He went on to say that Singapore companies that have decided to invest in Myanmar have done so on commercial grounds, not over “political influence or political suggestion” from the Government.
“I say all these in order to head off suggestions that we should now interfere on political grounds with commercial decisions,” said Dr Balakrishnan.
While it is true that sanctions might possibly affect the country and its people, it will also put significant pressure on the ruling junta as the country won’t be able to sustain itself for long with sanctions in place.
There is a way to put that sort of pressure on the junta without totally disadvantaging the people – that is to do what the US and EU have done by imposing targeting sanctions on those responsible for the coup, the military leaders.
As pressure mounted for more countries to take stronger action in denouncing and calling for an end to the coup, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) said in late February that there are no “significant funds” from Myanmar individuals and companies in banks in Singapore.
By making that statement, is MAS effectively admitting that Myanmar military leaders do have monies in Singapore? And what exactly is “significant”?
Given the many sanctions imposed on Myanmar’s military leaders already by the US, UK, Canada, and EU—and the fact that the Tatmadaw has doubled down against anti-coup protestors instead of ending the coup despite sanctions—it is difficult to imagine that these military leaders have monies anywhere else other than in Myanmar and Singapore, and perhaps China which has yet to impose sanctions either.
Given the close ties between Myanmar and Singapore that has been cultivated over the years as document in Selth’s book, “Burma’s Secret Military Partners”, Singapore can do more.
Singapore can put pressure upon Myanmar’s military leaders by threatening to freeze their assets held here—regardless how insignificant MAS may claim it to be. This would achieve a greater effect than sanctions by the US or the EU that cannot reach their properties. This is something that Singapore can surely do, unless it deems the action of the military leaders in this recent coup as legitimate and legal.
Singapore should respect the spirit of democracy and rule of law in the region
Singapore should not put hope that the coup will end in the way it had in the late 80s—which ultimately resulted in thousands of deaths at the hands of the military, illegal detention and imprisonment of tens of thousands of democracy leaders, and a rough road to a democratically elected government which the junta did not recognise at first.
It will be a stain on the country if Singapore continues to recognise those responsible for the coup in Myanmar by protecting their assets despite the undeniable violations of laws and human rights which goes against the values and beliefs that Singapore upholds.
In the long run, the youths and future leaders of Myanmar will surely remember Singapore’s support of the military regime in this coup, and its hesitance to take strong action against top military officers in order to help bring an end to this bloody moment in history.
The youths remember, much like how the students who led the protest in Myanmar’s 1988 uprising are now making their voices heard in the current anti-coup demonstrations calling for an end to military rule as they did three decades ago.
Additionally, with the increasing calls for a global arms embargo from the United Nations Security Council against Myanmar, Singapore companies that support the illegal regime will face sanctions and the city state’s reputation will face the risk of being tarnished.
In a recent report, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights situation in Myanmar, Thomas Andrews, urged for the international community to “act urgently and decisively” in support of those demanding for the return of democracy there.
Ultimately, Singapore should stop making public motherhood statements that simply condemn the chaos and violence happening in Myanmar today but actually take real action to put an end to it by imposing sanctions on military leaders who are responsible for these transgressions and rape of democracy.
