The Singapore Police have clarified that there are no legal obstacles preventing Mr Lee Hsien Yang (LHY), the younger son of the late founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (LKY), and his wife, Mrs Lee Suet Fern (LSF), from returning to Singapore.

This statement, released on 11 October 2023 in response to media queries, follows renewed interest in LHY’s potential return after the death of his older sister, Dr Lee Wei Ling, on 9 October 2023.

“In response to media queries, the police confirm that there are no legal restraints to Mr Lee Hsien Yang and Mrs Lee Suet Fern returning to Singapore. They are and have always been free to return to Singapore.”

“The police had asked both Mr Lee and Mrs Lee in June 2022 to assist in investigations by attending an interview. They had initially agreed but in the end did not turn up for the scheduled interview, left Singapore on Jun 15, 2022, and have not returned since.”

“They are and have always been free to return to Singapore,” said the police.

The topic of LHY’s return has resurfaced, particularly after he announced that he would not be present at his sister’s wake and funeral.

Instead, he is overseeing the arrangements remotely, while his son, Li Huanwu, manages them in Singapore in line with Dr Lee’s wishes. Dr Lee Wei Ling passed away at the age of 69, having battled progressive supranuclear palsy, a rare brain disorder, for four years.

While the police have emphasised that there are no travel restrictions for LHY and LSF, it’s important to recognise the potentially contradictory nature of this statement.

The police have not provided any guarantees that LHY and LSF would not be arrested upon their return or have their passports impounded, given that they could be considered a flight risk.

Furthermore, The Straits Times, Channel News Asia, and other media reports did not address a significant recent legal development involving Mdm Kwa Kim Li. This omission is notable because it relates directly to the ongoing legal complexities surrounding the Lee family’s disputes.

In its coverage, ST highlighted that “In 2020, the Court of Three Judges and a disciplinary tribunal found that Mr Lee Hsien Yang (LHY) and Mrs Lee Suet Fern (LSF) had lied under oath during disciplinary proceedings against Mrs Lee, a lawyer, over her handling of the last will of Mr Lee Kuan Yew, who died on 23 March 2015, at the age of 91.”

This framing appears to justify the ongoing investigations into LHY and LSF, yet the report notably omits a significant development: Mdm Kwa Kim Li, the former lawyer of Lee Kuan Yew, was found guilty of misleading the executors about her knowledge of the will.

In May 2023, a Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) found Mdm Kwa guilty of misconduct after determining that she had, in fact, been aware of the intended changes to the will and misrepresented her role in the matter.

The tribunal determined that Mdm Kwa had misled the executors of Lee Kuan Yew’s estate—Dr Lee and LHY—by withholding critical information regarding the instructions she received from Lee Kuan Yew about his will.

Her statements falsely claimed that LKY had never instructed her to amend his will, despite evidence of her correspondence with him about potential changes in November and December 2013.

The DT ruled that her conduct fell short of the standards expected of a solicitor and imposed penalties, including a fine of S$8,000 and additional costs to the Law Society of Singapore.

This development provides crucial context to the allegations put forth against LHY and LSF, who are accused of lying about Mdm Kwa’s involvement in the drafting of the last will.

Another critical aspect that I think needs to be highlighted is the open-ended nature of the ongoing investigations into LHY and LSF.

In theory, the police have the authority to continue their investigations for as long as they deem necessary. There is no legally prescribed timeframe by which they must conclude their inquiries, allowing them the discretion to keep the investigation active indefinitely.

This aspect adds to the uncertainty surrounding LHY and LSF’s situation, especially given that any return could potentially reignite legal scrutiny.

I’ve had my own experience with the lengthy nature of police investigations, which can take years to resolve.

When I was investigated for contempt of court back in July 2020, the authorities sought to impound my passport under Section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Even after serving my time for criminal defamation of cabinet members for corruption, they seized my passport again until I challenged the decision in July 2022 to have it returned.

After regaining my passport in August 2022, I left Singapore immediately—without giving the police a chance to issue another order to seize it. Since the IMDA revoked its license, it is now illegal for me to operate The Online Citizen within Singapore.

Although the case took nearly three years to conclude, eventually closing in March 2023 with a warning issued to me, I was already out of the police’s jurisdiction by then. It’s uncertain how much longer the police might have taken to close the case if I had remained in Singapore, as the investigation could have been prolonged at their discretion.

This experience gives me some insight into why LHY might remain overseas despite the police’s statement that there are no travel restrictions.

LHY and his family have been subject to various investigations by the Singapore government following public criticism by Dr Lee and him in a highly publicised dispute, where they criticised their elder brother, Lee Hsien Loong, the former Prime Minister, over alleged abuse of his position.

His wife, LSF, was suspended for 15 months over alleged misconduct as a lawyer, related to the handling of LKY’s last will. His son, Li Shengwu, was fined for contempt of court over a private Facebook post.

In March last year, LHY posted on Facebook, “I am heartbroken that my own country has made me a fugitive for standing up for my father’s promise, Lee Kuan Yew.”

Back in 2022, Li Shengwu posted on X, stating, “It has been five years since I left home because of a political prosecution by the Singapore government. Friends often ask me if it’s safe to return.

The court case is technically over. However, I assess that there’s a substantial risk that my uncle, the Prime Minister, would find an excuse to imprison me if I were to return to Singapore. He likes to relitigate old disputes.”

It has been 5 years since I left home, because of a political prosecution by the Singapore government. Friends often ask me if it's safe to return.

— Shengwu Li (@ShengwuLi) July 10, 2022

Channel News Asia’s (CNA) recent article, “Views stay divided on POFMA five years on, but has it helped in tackling fake news?” on the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) is presented as a  balanced reflection on the law five years after its enactment after a very controversial parliamentary process.

However, the article raises significant concerns about its lack of objectivity, transparency, and the selective representation of public sentiments toward the law.

Given CNA’s ownership by the Singapore government through Temasek Holdings, these concerns highlight the limitations of state-funded media in critically evaluating government policies. In Singaporean terms, this article shows how “ownself check ownself” literally “cannot make it”.

Lack of Transparency in Claims

The article claims that CNA reached out to “several recipients” of past POFMA orders to discuss their experiences.

Yet, after cross-checking with numerous POFMA recipients, it appears that only two individuals confirmed being contacted.

Crucially, major targets of POFMA orders, such as The Online Citizen (TOC), Kenneth Jeyaretnam, and the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)—all of whom have been frequent recipients of POFMA correction directions—were not approached for comment.

This was confirmed by the above and also by Worker’s Party’s Yee Jenn Jong and Progress Singapore Party’s Leong Mun Wai,

This omission distorts the narrative, leaving out key perspectives from those who have been most affected by POFMA, casting serious doubts on the objectivity of the article as a whole.

Moreover, when contacted for clarification on who among POFMA recipients was reached out to, the article’s author did not respond.

This lack of transparency further undermines the credibility of CNA’s claim that it attempted to consult multiple stakeholders. By selectively omitting arguably the most important voices, the article fails to provide a comprehensive view of how POFMA has been applied or received.

Selective Representation of Public Sentiment

CNA’s portrayal of public sentiment toward POFMA is similarly problematic.

The article claims that “a majority” of those interviewed agreed with the necessity of the law to combat falsehoods.

However, this assertion seems at odds with the article’s reception on social media—or, more specifically, its absence online.

CNA chose not to post the article on its usual primary social media platforms, opting instead to post it only on Telegram.

This unusual choice suggests CNA may have anticipated criticism of the article’s narrative and sought to limit public engagement. This does not speak to confidence in the assertion that the “majority” of those interviewed agreed with the law unless the interviewees were restricted to a very narrow echo chamber.

Even on Telegram, the response was overwhelmingly negative, with 372 users disliking the post versus 70 expressing approval.

While this is not a representative sample of the entire population, it directly challenges the article’s claim that most people support POFMA.

The negative reaction on Telegram further undermines the argument that public sentiment is largely in favour of the law, particularly when the CNA itself avoided posting the article where public scrutiny could be more visible and objectively documented.

TOC also posted a survey on Facebook asking if people were in support of the law, with the majority saying no. We recognized the limitations of the survey and did not try to claim to present a balanced view of the law but rather an estimate of public perception based on an open, transparent survey.

The Hidden Costs of Challenging POFMA

One of the most misleading aspects of CNA’s coverage is the Ministry of Law’s (MinLaw) claim that the lack of challenges to POFMA orders indicates that recipients knew they were spreading falsehoods.

This interpretation ignores the significant financial, emotional, and legal barriers to challenging POFMA orders.

It also ignores the fact that while the majority of POFMA recipients have not formally challenged the orders in court, many of them published statements disagreeing with the correction directions that they were forced to carry.

To get some idea about how onerous a formal legal challenge to a POFMA direction, just visit the instruction page to learn how to go about filing a POFMA appeal; simply looking at the fees and potential costs involved is intimidating enough.

The fees listed also do not include the cost of hiring a lawyer to represent the individual or entity in court. While you can represent yourself in court, based on TOC’s experience, you would be facing three trained legal professionals arguing against you, which would be very challenging, to say the least.

The reality is that for many, complying with a POFMA order is the path of least resistance, especially when the alternative is public embarrassment, legal intimidation (if they cannot afford a lawyer), and the financial burden of a court battle.

TOC, which has filed the most court applications against POFMA with three applications and received the most directions at 15—more if you include Gutzy Asia’s directions—stopped contesting some of the more recent orders not because it admitted to spreading falsehoods but because the legal process is too onerous and costly.

Because of the way the law is written, challenging a POFMA order is, in most cases, less about proving truth or falsehood but rather about how government ministers frame their statements as being false.

The “multiple meanings” rule taken to be the yardstick by which statements are judged under POFMA presents a huge challenge to anyone making a statement as it would imply that any statement has to take into account varied interpretations beyond the original intent of the statement maker. This legal quagmire deters even those with legitimate cases from fighting back.

A prime example is Terry Xu’s case, where he challenged a POFMA order issued by Minister of Home Affairs and Law K Shanmugam in 2023.

Despite Mr Shanmugam’s statement in parliament that no costs would be imposed on individuals who contest POFMA orders, the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) tried to obtain legal costs from Xu.

The court ultimately rejected AGC’s claim and ordered the AGC to pay Xu S$2,500 in costs for the failed application.

Following the Court of Appeal’s ruling that one must establish a prima facie case that the alleged falsehood is true (in other words, that the burden of proof falls on the person who has allegedly made the false statement rather than on the Minister), TOC also had to withdraw its appeal against the POFMA correction direction regarding Ho Ching’s salary after the AGC threatened to seek costs.

It would have been challenging for TOC to contest the case, as the claim originated from a Taiwanese media outlet, which TOC merely reported on. Notably, the Taiwanese media outlet itself was not issued a POFMA correction direction.

This situation highlights a double standard, where media reporting on the government’s claims is not required to verify their truthfulness, given that POFMA directions do not apply to statements made by the government.

It also exemplifies the apparent arbitrariness of the POFMA process, a point that may have been hinted at in the CNA article but was not explored in depth.

A Skewed Perspective on POFMA’s Application

The CNA article also skirts around the fact that POFMA disproportionately targets opposition figures, activists, and independent media outlets.