Connect with us

Editorial

Temporary piecemeal measures cannot control the escalating prices of public housing in Singapore

Published

on

Just yesterday (29 Sep), the Singapore government announced measures introduced to promote sustainable conditions in the property market by ensuring prudent borrowing and moderating demand.

Of the measures announced, the Housing Development Board (HDB) will introduce an interest rate floor of 3% for computing the eligible loan amount from 30 Sept onwards and the loan-to-value (LTV) will be lowered by 5%-points from 85% to 80%. These apply for housing loans granted by HDB.

Not too long ago, HDB had already announced a reduction of limit for housing loans from HDB from 90% to 85% in Dec 2021.

This close sequence of control measures would indicate to some that something must have been so troubling for the government to have elicited such a reaction.

Truth be told, many members of the Singapore Parliament filed questions to the Ministry over the past year for updates on the affordability of public housing following resale prices of HDB flats rising for 26th straight month in August.

TODAY reported just last week that it is only “a matter of time” before Singapore sees its first million-dollar BTO flat, based on opinions voiced by property analysts.

Beyond mere speculation, one can easily see that horizon nearing us with the top end of a 5-room flat offered in the August BTO launch at Ang Mo Kio being priced at S$877,000. One can even say it is not impossible for resale flats to reach S$2 million in 20 years’ time.

Even with the introduction of a minimum occupation period (MOP) of 10 years before buyers can sell their flats in the open market or invest in a private residential property, it is still not far-fetched for people to continue the perception that the HDB balloting for new BTO flats — particularly those in mature estates — is a form of lottery where one can cash out their earnings after a period of time.

It is pretty obvious from MND’s own data which was made available in response to Workers’ Party MP, Mr Leon Perera that it would be a definite profit if one were able to sell the balloted flat after the MOP regardless of the 5 or 10-year MOP.

Take the median price for a 5-room flat bought in 2012 which is S$376,000 and supposed it is sold ten years later at the median price provided by the Ministry at S$530,000. That is a hefty profit of S$154,000. This would probably even be much higher for flats in mature estates such as Ang Mo Kio at the median price of $785,000 for a five-room flat in 2022.

Of course, the profit drops for units below 4-rooms but at the same time, this is the same reason why most couples with the means of buying a larger unit, would choose to do so.

So what if the BTO flats become $1 million? The buyer can just seek to sell it off at a higher price ten or twenty years down the road. There is, after all, no cap on how much a flat owner can sell the flat in the resale market so long as there are willing buyers.

Measures Do Not Control Rising Cost But To Make Those Who Cannot Afford Ineligible

Going back to the latest response by the Singapore government to introduce control measures, frankly, it does not seem to do much other than making the flats which had seemed costly for the citizens, to be totally out of reach from them.

Of course, the government will continue to say that HDB flats are affordable.

In his response to Mr Perera’s parliamentary question, Mr Desmond Lee, Minister for National Development wrote that flat owners only need to use 13% to 26% of their monthly income to pay for their loan instalments. This is well below the international benchmark of 30% to 35%.

But Mr Lee’s justification is kind of questionable given that flat purchasers would have to meet the qualifying criteria to apply for an HDB loan (such as income) in the first place.

For example, using the regulation set by HDB on housing loans, even if the price for a BTO HDB unit is S$1 million, Mr Lee’s answer to Mr Perera would still stand because the flat owners have to first qualify for the loan with their proof of income and ability to pay for the down payment before they could purchase the flat.

Unrestrained Hike In HDB Prices Unsustainable In The Long Run For The Past And Future Generations

It is in the interest of the government that the price of HDB flats continues to rise. After all, it is definitely the main culprit for the escalating price of public housing by tying the valuation of BTO flats to the prices of surrounding resale flats. On top of that, people are still being sold the idea that HDB flats can be cashed out at the end of the day for their retirement fund.

But if you noticed by now, this pricing method of property premising on the idea that you can “definitely” cash out with a profit, will eventually spiral out of control for the general masses. Especially since the average salary for ordinary citizens will not be able to keep up with such rate of inflation — Note the position taken by Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister where he cautioned against increasing wages too quickly and how it could hurt Singapore’s economy.

Let us also not forget that we are talking about affordable public housing for the common folks here and not private housing meant for asset appreciation or speculation.

With the Ang Mo Kio SERS saga that has yet to be resolved, we can see the pitfalls of the current public housing scheme for seniors. Where if you are forced to sell your flat when it is aged, you are greeted with the harsh reality that the cost of getting a new flat requires you to come up with a huge cash upfront when you are already retired.

In a way, this also dispels the common belief that you can comfortably retire with the proceed from selling your HDB flat as you would nevertheless require an alternative place to stay. While you might be able to afford one by downsizing and going for a shorter lease, it is questionable if you benefited from such a transaction, given the displacement and marginal profit if any.

Alternatives Moving Forward And Going Back To Our Roots

Various entities have proposed alternatives for Singapore’s public housing particularly since issues arising from high prices and aging HDB flats have gradually stroke concerns of the flat owners.

Read: Singapore public housing policy: Comparing amendment proposals from WP, SDP & FOSG

Personally, I would think that the ideal way forward would be delinking the BTO price from the surrounding resale flats and mandating that all future sales of flats be made with HDB only. At the same time, allowing existing flat owners to continue with the resale market. This will ensure prices for HDB flats do not depreciate rapidly, eating into the assets of the flat owners, at the same time, preventing the vicious cycle of escalating prices for HDB flats — especially for the sake of the future generations of Singaporeans.

But of course, this has to be done in phases over an extended period of time for the market to properly react to the changes, coupled with other control measures such as disallowing Permanent Residents from purchasing HDB flats and reduction or removal of the land cost from the cost of flats.

Ultimately, Singapore as a country has to decide what public housing means for the people.

Is it a policy for the government to profit out of the people’s desire for home ownership, the average citizens’ means of having an appreciating asset for one’s retirement or a public policy to ensure all citizens regardless of their background and family heritage, able to have a roof over their heads and live with dignity?

Let us look back to the roots of public housing in Singapore, a policy in the 1960s that allowed many who were living in slums to have access to cheap, clean and safe accommodations; A public policy that has been the pride of Singapore citizens and the cause of envy from our neighbouring countries and the international community.

Continue Reading
Click to comment
Subscribe
Notify of
0 Comments
Newest
Oldest Most Voted
Inline Feedbacks
View all comments

Editorial

CNA’s one-sided POFMA coverage ignores key opposition and independent voices

[Editorial] Channel News Asia’s recent article on POFMA is marred by a lack of balance and transparency. By failing to engage key stakeholders and overlooking the challenges of contesting POFMA orders, the article skews public perception, reinforcing state narratives while ignoring critical perspectives.

Published

on

Channel News Asia’s (CNA) recent article, “Views stay divided on POFMA five years on, but has it helped in tackling fake news?” on the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) is presented as a  balanced reflection on the law five years after its enactment after a very controversial parliamentary process.

However, the article raises significant concerns about its lack of objectivity, transparency, and the selective representation of public sentiments toward the law.

Given CNA’s ownership by the Singapore government through Temasek Holdings, these concerns highlight the limitations of state-funded media in critically evaluating government policies. In Singaporean terms, this article shows how “ownself check ownself” literally “cannot make it”.

Lack of Transparency in Claims

The article claims that CNA reached out to “several recipients” of past POFMA orders to discuss their experiences.

Yet, after cross-checking with numerous POFMA recipients, it appears that only two individuals confirmed being contacted.

Crucially, major targets of POFMA orders, such as The Online Citizen (TOC), Kenneth Jeyaretnam, and the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)—all of whom have been frequent recipients of POFMA correction directions—were not approached for comment.

This was confirmed by the above and also by Worker’s Party’s Yee Jenn Jong and Progress Singapore Party’s Leong Mun Wai,

This omission distorts the narrative, leaving out key perspectives from those who have been most affected by POFMA, casting serious doubts on the objectivity of the article as a whole.

Moreover, when contacted for clarification on who among POFMA recipients was reached out to, the article’s author did not respond.

This lack of transparency further undermines the credibility of CNA’s claim that it attempted to consult multiple stakeholders. By selectively omitting arguably the most important voices, the article fails to provide a comprehensive view of how POFMA has been applied or received.

Selective Representation of Public Sentiment

CNA’s portrayal of public sentiment toward POFMA is similarly problematic.

The article claims that “a majority” of those interviewed agreed with the necessity of the law to combat falsehoods.

However, this assertion seems at odds with the article’s reception on social media—or, more specifically, its absence online.

CNA chose not to post the article on its usual primary social media platforms, opting instead to post it only on Telegram.

This unusual choice suggests CNA may have anticipated criticism of the article’s narrative and sought to limit public engagement. This does not speak to confidence in the assertion that the “majority” of those interviewed agreed with the law unless the interviewees were restricted to a very narrow echo chamber.

Even on Telegram, the response was overwhelmingly negative, with 372 users disliking the post versus 70 expressing approval.

While this is not a representative sample of the entire population, it directly challenges the article’s claim that most people support POFMA.

The negative reaction on Telegram further undermines the argument that public sentiment is largely in favour of the law, particularly when the CNA itself avoided posting the article where public scrutiny could be more visible and objectively documented.

TOC also posted a survey on Facebook asking if people were in support of the law, with the majority saying no. We recognized the limitations of the survey and did not try to claim to present a balanced view of the law but rather an estimate of public perception based on an open, transparent survey.

The Hidden Costs of Challenging POFMA

One of the most misleading aspects of CNA’s coverage is the Ministry of Law’s (MinLaw) claim that the lack of challenges to POFMA orders indicates that recipients knew they were spreading falsehoods.

This interpretation ignores the significant financial, emotional, and legal barriers to challenging POFMA orders.

It also ignores the fact that while the majority of POFMA recipients have not formally challenged the orders in court, many of them published statements disagreeing with the correction directions that they were forced to carry.

To get some idea about how onerous a formal legal challenge to a POFMA direction, just visit the instruction page to learn how to go about filing a POFMA appeal; simply looking at the fees and potential costs involved is intimidating enough.

The fees listed also do not include the cost of hiring a lawyer to represent the individual or entity in court. While you can represent yourself in court, based on TOC’s experience, you would be facing three trained legal professionals arguing against you, which would be very challenging, to say the least.

The reality is that for many, complying with a POFMA order is the path of least resistance, especially when the alternative is public embarrassment, legal intimidation (if they cannot afford a lawyer), and the financial burden of a court battle.

TOC, which has filed the most court applications against POFMA with three applications and received the most directions at 15—more if you include Gutzy Asia’s directions—stopped contesting some of the more recent orders not because it admitted to spreading falsehoods but because the legal process is too onerous and costly.

Because of the way the law is written, challenging a POFMA order is, in most cases, less about proving truth or falsehood but rather about how government ministers frame their statements as being false.

The “multiple meanings” rule taken to be the yardstick by which statements are judged under POFMA presents a huge challenge to anyone making a statement as it would imply that any statement has to take into account varied interpretations beyond the original intent of the statement maker. This legal quagmire deters even those with legitimate cases from fighting back.

A prime example is Terry Xu’s case, where he challenged a POFMA order issued by Minister of Home Affairs and Law K Shanmugam in 2023.

Despite Mr Shanmugam’s statement in parliament that no costs would be imposed on individuals who contest POFMA orders, the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) tried to obtain legal costs from Xu.

The court ultimately rejected AGC’s claim and ordered the AGC to pay Xu S$2,500 in costs for the failed application.

This particular incident highlights the intimidating legal environment surrounding POFMA challenges, where even promises made in parliament appear to be disregarded by government agencies.

Following the Court of Appeal’s ruling that one must establish a prima facie case that the alleged falsehood is true (in other words, that the burden of proof falls on the person who has allegedly made the false statement rather than on the Minister), TOC also had to withdraw its appeal against the POFMA correction direction regarding Ho Ching’s salary after the AGC threatened to seek costs.

It would have been challenging for TOC to contest the case, as the claim originated from a Taiwanese media outlet, which TOC merely reported on. Notably, the Taiwanese media outlet itself was not issued a POFMA correction direction.

This situation highlights a double standard, where media reporting on the government’s claims is not required to verify their truthfulness, given that POFMA directions do not apply to statements made by the government.

It also exemplifies the apparent arbitrariness of the POFMA process, a point that may have been hinted at in the CNA article but was not explored in depth.

A Skewed Perspective on POFMA’s Application

The CNA article also skirts around the fact that POFMA disproportionately targets opposition figures, activists, and independent media outlets.

It briefly notes that nine out of fourteen POFMA cases in 2023 involved opposition members or political candidates but fails to explore the implications of this statistic.

Instead of engaging with the criticism that POFMA is used selectively to suppress dissent, the article repeats MinLaw’s assertion that the process is rigorous and impartial.

However, selective enforcement is a real concern.

For example, the repeated use of POFMA against opposition figures and activists raises questions about whether the law is being applied fairly as promised against threats to public safety or as a tool to stifle political opponents of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP).

By failing to address these concerns, CNA’s article gives the impression that POFMA’s application is fair and just and above reproach, which does not align with the experiences of those who have been most affected by it.

The article also fails to address how POFMA directions have predominantly been issued by a particular minister and his ministries.

If POFMA were intended to address falsehoods more broadly, one would expect a more even distribution of applications across different ministries, rather than the clear disparity seen in the statistics. (refer to TOC’s documented directions here)

CNA’s Reporting Reflects the Limitations of State Media

CNA’s article on POFMA misses the opportunity to provide a balanced and transparent evaluation of the law’s impact.

Given that CNA is state-owned and funded by Temasek Holdings, its coverage is naturally aligned with the government’s narrative, which explains the lack of critical engagement with the law’s flaws and controversies.

Rather than providing a platform for meaningful debate, CNA’s reporting reinforces the government’s position on POFMA while excluding key voices from the conversation.

Moreover, the decision to limit the article’s visibility on social media raises concerns about CNA’s willingness to engage with public criticism in general.

Ultimately, CNA’s coverage reflects the broader limitations of state media in critically analyzing government policies.

By failing to engage with all relevant stakeholders and presenting a one-sided view of POFMA, CNA’s reporting risks becoming an echo chamber for official government positions, rather than a platform for balanced, independent journalism.

With the SPH Media Trust also coming under the government’s financial umbrella, Singaporeans are at risk of being deprived of critically important news analysis due to this dominance by a one-sided official narrative.

Continue Reading

Editorial

Undying Phoenix: TOC navigates regulatory restrictions with a revamped approach

Despite new regulations hindering operations, The Online Citizen Asia (TOC) views this as a chance to return to its roots, launching Gutzy Asia for Greater Asian news, while refocusing on Singapore. Inviting volunteer support, TOC’s commitment to truth and transparency remains unshakeable amidst these constraints.

Published

on

On 21 July 2023, the Ministry of Communications and Information, under the leadership of Minister Josephine Teo, declared The Online Citizen Asia’s (TOC) website and social media platforms as Declared Online Locations (DOL) according to the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (POFMA).

This decision follows a series of alleged false statements propagated by TOC, with the most recent incident reported on 2 May.

Amidst a politically charged environment characterized by scandals involving the People’s Action Party and increasing public mistrust towards the ruling government, TOC will continue to operate, albeit under significant constraints, despite the regulatory restrictions imposed.

The DOL declaration mandates that TOC must carry a public notice on its online platforms, which indicates its alleged history of disseminating misinformation.

The POFMA Office, however, clarified that TOC can continue its operations, retaining its website and social media pages under stringent regulations, particularly concerning monetization.

According to Part 5 of the POFMA, TOC is prohibited from gaining financial or material benefits from its operations. Additionally, offering financial support to TOC is equally unlawful. For the next two years, TOC will be compelled to self-sustain, relying solely on its resources without any public backing.

It strikes TOC as notably ironic that the Singapore government, eager to stymie our operations to prevent the spread of “fake news”, simultaneously demonstrates a fervour to invest S$900 million of taxpayer funds into the SPH Media Trust, currently embroiled in a data misrepresentation scandal. This dichotomy indeed presents a masterclass in cognitive dissonance.

Despite these significant constraints, TOC views this as an opportunity to revert to its roots, replicating the enthusiasm and drive that characterized our operation following our establishment in 2006.

Our existing staff will transition to a new publication, Gutzy Asia, focusing on news from Greater Asia, while TOC will refocus on its primary subject, Singapore, hence dropping the Asia subtext.

In this transition, we invite volunteers passionate about journalism and holding power to account to join us in our mission. We also welcome contributions from Singapore’s political parties, offering them a platform to express their perspectives and provide updates.

While this change may result in a decrease in content volume and frequency, we assure our supporters that our commitment to truth and transparency remains steadfast. We are legally obliged not to seek financial aid, but we hope our supporters will provide us with manpower and information support.

We are resolute in our decision to continue TOC’s operations, standing in defiance against attempts to silence dissent through lawsuits and intimidating regulations. We are here to serve the people, and we will continue our mission with determination and resilience.

To keep up to date with the publication: Follow The Online Citizen via telegram (Gutzy Asia’s posts are included)

Continue Reading

Trending